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ABSTRACT
How Failures Cascade in Software Systems
Barbara W. Chamberlin
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
Cascading failures involve a failure in one system component that triggers failures in
successive system components, potentially leading to system wide failures. While frequently
used fault tolerant techniques can reduce the severity and the frequency of such failures,
they continue to occur in practice. To better understand how failures cascade, we have
conducted a qualitative analysis of 55 cascading failures, described in 26 publicly available
incident reports. Through this analysis we have identified 16 types of cascading mechanisms
(organized into eight categories) that capture the nature of the system interactions that
contribute to cascading failures. We also discuss three themes based on the observation
that the cascading failures we have analyzed occurred in one of three ways: a component
being unable to tolerate a failure in another component, through the actions of support or
automation systems as they respond to an initial failure, or during system recovery. We
believe that the 16 cascading mechanisms we present and the three themes we discuss, provide
important insights into some of the challenges associated with engineering a truly resilient
and well-supported system.

Keywords: software design, cascading failure, graceful degradation, fault tolerance, graceful
recovery
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How Failures Cascade in Software Systems
well-supported system. We believe that this line of research
has the potential to improve our ability to engineer systems
in which a failure in one component is less likely to cascade
through other components.
As a step toward that research goal, we have conducted a
qualitative analysis of 26 incidents from a database of incident
reports which was collected as part of a previous research
project [30]. The unit of analysis for the research is a failure
pair, which is two failures either in distinct components, or in
the same component, separated by time, where one failure is
understood (by the authors of the incident report) as being the
cause of the other. In our review of the 26 incident reports,
we identified 55 failure pairs. Using a process similar to
that described by Corbin and Strauss [6], we first coded and
categorized each failure pair, then identified key cascading
failure related themes. For more details on our analysis, see
section III.
In reporting our analytic results in this paper, we make
the following contributions. First, we describe 16 types of
cascading mechanisms, organized into eight categories, that
we identified in our analysis. These capture the nature of
the system interactions that contribute to cascading failures
and provide insights into some of the challenges associated
with engineering a truly resilient and well-supported system.
Second, we describe three higher-level themes identified in our
analysis, which we argue suggest alternative ways to design
and build systems that are truly resilient.

Abstract—Cascading failures involve a failure in one system
component that triggers failures in successive system components,
potentially leading to system wide failures. While frequently
used fault tolerant techniques can reduce the severity and the
frequency of such failures, they continue to occur in practice.
To better understand how failures cascade, we have conducted
a qualitative analysis of 55 cascading failures, described in 26
publicly available incident reports. Through this analysis we have
identified 16 types of cascading mechanisms (organized into eight
categories) that capture the nature of the system interactions that
contribute to cascading failures. We also discuss three themes
based on the observation that the cascading failures we have
analyzed occurred in one of three ways: a component being
unable to tolerate a failure in another component, through the
actions of support or automation systems as they respond to an
initial failure, or during system recovery. We believe that the
16 cascading mechanisms we present and the three themes we
discuss, provide important insights into some of the challenges
associated with engineering a truly resilient and well-supported
system.

I. I NTRODUCTION
In the discussion of software failures, and cascading failures in particular, we define a software failure as “an event
that occurs when the delivered service deviates from correct
service.” [2] A cascading failure is a “kind of failure in a
system comprising interconnected parts, in which the failure
of a part can trigger the failure of successive parts.” [20]
When a software system experiences a failure, responders are
notified to investigate and mitigate the problem. In this paper,
we refer to such an event as an incident. After an incident is
mitigated, organizations may conduct a postmortem analysis
of the incident and produce an incident report [5].
Work in multiple software engineering research areas can
be seen, at least partially, as aiming to reduce the likelihood
of failures or cascading failures (see for example work on
defect detection and prediction [16]). Existing fault-tolerance
techniques, such as load balancing, circuit breakers, caching
and queuing, aim to reduce cascading failures by engineering
a system component so that it can tolerate failures in its
dependencies or dependents [2]. Cascading failures have also
been studied in fields such as civil engineering and complexity
theory [28]. In that work, it is clear that the larger and more
complex the system, the more likely it is to suffer cascading
failures, and insufficient slack in the system will make the
cascading failure worse [1].
Missing from previous work is a comprehensive and detailed look at the ways that failures cascade between software
system components. So, to fill that gap, the goal of our ongoing
research is to identify and analyze in detail what we call
cascading mechanisms. Our research also aims to explore the
challenges associated with engineering a truly resilient and

II. BACKGROUND AND R ELATED W ORK
This research draws from a variety of different fields.
The name “cascading failure” comes from engineering and
networking, and there is a large body of engineering research
pertaining to it [25]. In that context, a cascading failure occurs
in networks where each node has essentially the same function
as all other nodes, and there are hundreds or thousands of
nodes, such as electrical grids, water and sewer pipes, traffic,
telecommunications, and the internet. When one node fails, it
requires other nodes to take up its share of the load, and if
the network as a whole has insufficient slack, then other nodes
fail, causing a chain reaction [1], [19].
However, in the context of software systems and in our
work, cascading failures are defined more broadly as a “kind
of failure in a system comprising interconnected parts, in
which the failure of a part can trigger the failure of successive
parts.” [20] So, in the following, we discuss relevant software
engineering research in the areas of failures and prevention
(see Sections II-A), fault tolerance (Section II-C) and graceful
degradation (Section II-B). We also discuss previous work
related to complex systems and complexity theory, because it
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addresses unexpected behavior emerging from the interactions
of connected components (see Section II-D).
In a defect tracking system, a software organization may
categorize failures by priority, severity, effect, location/type,
and detection activity [33]. Previous research on failure categorization has tended to categorize failures based on the
defects that cause the initial failure, and generally do not
directly consider cascading effects. For example, Grottke et
al. categorize defects into Bohrbugs, Mandelbugs, and agingrelated bugs [14], [7].
Similarly, previous research has considered how to prevent various categories of failures. Ganesh et al. looked at
ways to prevent aging-related bugs using techniques such as
preemptive migration and software rejuvenation [11]. Ghosh
et al. and Shin et al. investigated a variety of self-healing
techniques [12], [29]. Monperrus looked at using AI to automatically generate code to fix failures [24]. Fault injection
is currently an active area of research. It is used to analyze
the reliability of specific systems [17] and to try to predict
likely failure rates [32][3]. While some of these techniques
are likely relevant to preventing cascading failures, they have
not yet been applied in that context. We hope the research
we are reporting in this paper can identify ways that previous
prevention research can be expanded to consider cascading
failures.

something causes the system to go down for a longer period
of time, retries will not help and may stress the system further.
In this case, the circuit breaker pattern can prevent some or all
of the traffic to the struggling system to allow time for it to
recover on its own or to be repaired by engineers [31], [26].
When the reliability of the hardware is important, the normal
approach is to provide redundant hardware. When redundancy
is used, it is sometimes necessary, when the primary resource
provider goes down, for the backups to elect a new primary.
Duplicate hardware may also be used to provide additional
worker processes. In that case a load leveler is needed to
distribute the work evenly. The queue-based load-leveling
pattern may be used to even out the flow to an acceptable
distribution [26]. If the load leveling is insufficient, the system
may need to implement load shedding, either at random or by
priority. If part or all of the system is located in the cloud, then
health monitoring is an important technique to determine if the
system is behaving as expected. Auto scaling is also used in
cloud computing to provide the correct number of resources
based on the current load of traffic to the system [22].
Naturally, various fault-tolerance techniques are relevant to
cascading failures. As these techniques are in use in many
systems today, including systems in our data set, our research
has the potential to improve our understanding of their effectiveness and of their limitations in the context of cascading
failures. We also hope that our work can inform and inspire
the design of novel fault-tolerance techniques.

B. Graceful Degradation

D. Complex Systems

When a system loses some functionality and is unable to
automatically fix it, the system still needs to keep working
to some extent. Graceful degradation means that while the
system is not fully operational, it is handling its tasks as well
as possible under the circumstances [15], [10]. Current work
on graceful degradation tends to focus on scheduling tasks for
multi-processor systems based upon their priority level [13].
Some of the failures in our data set may have been preventable
if graceful degradation had been designed into the system.

Emergent behavior is defined as originating in the relationship between components. It is “behavior that is not attributed
to any individual agent, but is a global outcome of agent coordination. ... Emergent behavior is a collective behavior.” [18]
Cascading failure is a type of emergent behavior that is often
present in complex systems [23].
In the book Meltdown, Clearfield et.al. discuss several cases
of catastrophic cascading failure and general principles that
may help prevent such severe failures in complex systems large
and small [4]. Cascading failure is driven by the connection
between parts, not by the parts themselves. Small failures
that are understood well in isolation can work together in
unexpected ways [19] to create a situation that is not well
understood. Charles Perrow, author of Normal Accidents:
Living with High-Risk Technologies, described complex interactions as those of “unfamiliar sequences, or unplanned and
unexpected sequences, and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible [sic]” [27]. One hallmark of complex
systems is that the interactions, which are not visible, must
be determined by indicators. Because we can’t look directly
into the system, we can’t know enough to predict all the
ramifications of a failure, even a small one. Linear systems, by
contrast, have connections that are clear and easy to investigate
and understand. They are much like an assembly line. Failure
of one component means that the next component will not be
able to start, but it doesn’t have any hidden effects on any
other component.

A. Categorizing and Preventing Failures

C. Fault Tolerance
Fault tolerance in general refers to a variety of techniques
that compensate for or tolerate failures in system components,
often with the goal of preventing cascading failures. Sometimes fault tolerant systems are able to fix the problem and
continue working as if it never happened [9]. Other times
graceful degradation, as discussed above, is the best that
can be achieved. Several software design patterns have been
developed specifically for the purpose of adding resiliency to
software systems [22]. Some examples include bulkhead, retries, circuit breaker, redundancy, load balancers, load levelers,
load shedding, health monitoring, and auto scaling. We will
briefly describe each of these techniques below.
The bulkhead pattern is used to isolate one or more subsections of the system to prevent failures from affecting
other sections [31]. Retries are a standard method for dealing
with transient faults or failures that may occur. However, if
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III. S TUDY S ETUP

and (3) the way that the first failure cascaded to the second
must be described.
To collect failure pairs for our analysis, we examined
incident reports in the IDB, identifying failure pairs and all
relevant report text. This collection step counts as a first level
of analysis, so we kept as much of the original wording as
possible to ensure accuracy in our summaries. Concretely, a
failure pair in our data set included four parts: an initial failure
which is the first in the pair of failures, a subsequent failure
which is caused by the first, architectural details describing
the relationship between the components that failed, and a
description of the relationship between failures describing how
the initial failure is believed to have caused the subsequent
failure. Rarely, there are two initial failures which are independent of each other, but are both required to bring about
the subsequent failure. The output from this analysis step is a
summary with those four parts.
As an example of what our collected data includes, incident
report BK describes database performance problems that were
caused by a downgrade of the database and “started a cascade
of other issues.” In our review of that incident, we identified
a failure pair (identified as BK.1 in this paper) that we
summarized as follows:
• Architecture: A service with a load balancer and autoscaler that depends on a hosted PostgreSQL database.
• Initial failure: Under daily peak load, database CPU
utilization maxed out. Some transactions were slow and
others failed.
• Resulting failure: Healthy servers (that were failing health
checks) were removed from the fleet, causing a complete
outage.
• Relationship: The health checks running on the servers attempted to connect to the database that was experiencing
performance issues and so began returning 500 responses,
triggering the load balancer to remove servers from the
fleet.
Some incidents had failures that we were not able to use
since the cascading mechanism was unclear. For example,
in incident D1 we identified three failure pairs. We also
found an additional failure pair where we could identify the
initial failure and the resulting failure, but not the relationship
between them. Even the engineers could not identify it at the
time of publication. “The exact cause of why this initial ...
outage cascaded into a full system failure is not known at this
time.” Although we reviewed a total of 35 incident reports,
nine of the reports2 did not include cascading failures that
met our inclusion criteria and will not be discussed further in
this paper.

Our source of data for this study is a collection of publicly
published incident reports, which are accounts of incidents
written by the company where they occurred. Our analytic aim
is to understand the ways that failures cascade between system
components, so the unit of analysis for this project is a failure
pair, which we define as two failures in distinct components,
or in the same component separated by time, where the first
failure is described in the incident report as being the cause
of the second failure.
We describe our data source in more detail below and then
describe our analytic approach. Broadly speaking, our analysis
is based on grounded theory, which generally proceeds in
three phases [6], [8], [21]. The first phase, open coding,
involves segmenting and categorizing data. As an example,
our open coding involved identifying and naming different
types of relationships between failures. The second phase,
axial coding, involves further analysis of the coded data,
including exploring how various categories relate to each other
and possibly creating hierarchical categories. The final phase,
selective coding, involves identifying one or more overarching
themes from the categories identified in earlier phases and
refining those to tell a cohesive story. Iterative in nature, rather
than strictly sequential, these three phases can channel back
into previous phases if necessary.
A. Data Source
The Incident Database (IDB) is a collection of publicly
published incident reports from a variety of companies. These
reports are the product of internal postmortem analyses and
generally describe significant system failures along with explanations of how and why they occurred and how they were
mitigated. The IDB contains structured summaries of these
incidents and is stored in a GitHub repository.1 The incidents
used in this analysis are summarized in Table I.
These incident reports were found by searching the web for
existing lists of postmortems using the search terms “list of
tech postmortems.” An incident report was included in IDB if
it was in English, published in 2010 or later, and had sufficient
detail to determine system architecture and the details of the
failures. We added incidents that we identified from these
searches (in a random order) to IDB. For this research we
read the first 35 incident reports in IDB to identify failure
pairs as described in the next section.
B. Data Collection
As mentioned above, the unit of analysis for this project
is a failure pair, which we define as two failures in distinct
components, or the same component separated by time, where
the first failure is described as being the cause of the second
failure. In order to be used in our analysis, a failure pair’s
description in the incident reports had to meet three conditions:
(1) the two cascading failures must be clearly described, (2) the
relationship between the two components must be included,

C. Analysis Process
For our analysis, we followed a grounded theory approach [6]. As noted above, the data collection was the first
analysis step, and we began with 14 incidents. For these
2 The excluded incident reports are numbers 2, 4, 17, 20, 23, 24, 26, 29,
31 in the incident database.

1 https://github.com/BYU-SE/idb
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TABLE I
A SUMMARY OF THE 26 INCIDENTS INCLUDED IN OUR ANALYSIS , ALONG WITH THE NUMBER OF FAILURE PAIRS IDENTIFIED IN EACH .
ID

Company

Report

Incident summary

#

A1
A2
A3
BK
CC
CF
D1
D2
E1
EG
G1
GC
GH
GH2
GL
HE
JO
MC
PL
RD
SF
ST
T2
TC
TS
TW

AWS
AWS
AWS
Buildkite
Circle CI
Cloudflare
Discord
Discord
Elastic
Epic Games
Google
GoCardless
Github
Github
GitLab
Heroku
Joyent
MailChimp
Parse.ly
Redit
Salesforce
Stripe
TravisCI
TravisCI
Tarsnap
Twilio

go.aws/3BiCVzd
go.aws/2YsdwUQ
go.aws/3oSKJnS
bit.ly/2xTnliK
bit.ly/3DgMfnB
bit.ly/2RoVfBu
bit.ly/2Yo61yY
bit.ly/3lfgoxj
bit.ly/3DxZy34
bit.ly/2XqzFjR
bit.ly/3ljaT0W
bit.ly/39UxK9R
bit.ly/3AhoEkT
bit.ly/3DG3rTZ
bit.ly/2wpqMMq
bit.ly/3am0smP
bit.ly/3Df7YMM
bit.ly/2yPjFOl
bit.ly/3c7sFwq
bit.ly/3lcBGM9
sforce.co/3mtPFNd
bit.ly/39Z5dQu
bit.ly/3CipBu5
bit.ly/3oEsDWA
bit.ly/3iDnlXm
bit.ly/3BjL3iQ

Bandwidth disruption led to re-mirroring storm and then spread to control plane
Missing control data led to errors in customer data and degraded performance
Accidental removal of servers from multiple data store clusters led to outages and backlogs
Database downgrade and connection pool configuration change led to outage at daily peak load
Pause in web hooks led to backlog and site degradation
Configuration deployment led to an increase in CPU usage and a global outage
Automated migration of primary datastore + a failover defect led to cascading outages
Errors on one cluster node + a defect led to a split cluster and delays for dependencies
Disconnections between two application layers led to excessive resync requests and an outage
High traffic caused 6 outages due to exceeding database, loadbalancer, memcached limits
Configuration error caused network control jobs to be descheduled and a network outage
Cluster management misconfiguration + coincident disk failure and process crash led to outage
Network interruption led to misconfigured database clusters, affecting latency and availability
Power outage led to multiple servers unable to restart
Database replication failure due to high load and accidental data deletion led to database outage
Maintenance operation that silently failed led to routing errors for application containers
Database deadlock due to autovacuum conflict with application transactions
Database maintenance processes failed due to high load, causing database shutdown
Usage growth exceeded network capacity of nodes in a cluster and led to a cascading outage
Autoscaler, unintentionally running during upgrade, terminated healthy servers leading to outage
High traffic exposed a firmware defect, leaving a database in a corrupt state
Existing configuration defect + multiple database failures caused a failed failover and an outage
Accidental (and permanent) deletion of virtual machine images broke build jobs
Clean up process was not updated with new passwords and failed silently, leading to resource leak
Errors in a dependency caused excessive logging and full disks, crashing colocated applications
Network disruption led to database failure and repeated customer credit card charges

4
2
2
3
2
1
3
3
2
3
1
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
3
3
1
3
1
4

first 14 incidents, both researchers independently reviewed
the incidents and identified the cascading failure pairs. They
then came together to discuss them until agreement was
reached on which failures to include/exclude and how to
describe them both accurately and succinctly. Open coding
the failure pairs, which is a categorizing exercise, involved
looking at failure pairs individually, though in the context of
the incident, and finding words or short phrases that described
the elements of interest in the pair. Both researchers coded
the failures individually, and we discussed the coding until
an initial and provisional set of codes was developed. As
an example, for the failure pair above (BK.1), we had the
following potential codes: Coupling, Load and Capacity/Time
based, Automation/Health Checks, Automation/Relentless and
indiscriminate, and Defect.
During the second round of analysis, we reviewed and
identified failure pairs in an additional 12 incidents. One
researcher identified the failure pairs while the other summarized the incidents. Both researchers then reviewed and refined
the other’s work. So, both researchers read and analyzed the
incidents, but in sequence instead of in parallel. We reached
saturation, that is we reached a point where we were not
finding new mechanisms, at 26 incident reports and 55 failure
pairs.
During the axial coding phase, which involved grouping

codes, interpreting them, and reflecting on their meanings [21],
we compared and contrasted failure pairs and, in the process,
fine-tuned our coding scheme. We chose to concentrate on the
relationships between failures, specifically on the cascading
mechanism which is primarily located in the relationship
descriptions in our data. Each mechanism, which explains how
the initial failure cascaded to additional failures even across
component boundaries, is different in the details, but often
similar in the broad outlines. The cascading mechanism in
the failure pair described above, BK.1, was ultimately named
Destructive health check actions, and we found three other
failure pairs in our data set with that same type of mechanism.
In this way we identified 16 types of cascading mechanisms,
which we then grouped into eight categories.
Finally, we identified three key themes that were central to
understanding how failures cascade, and how those cascading
events occur in different stages of an incident’s life cycle:
Ungraceful degradation, Automating failure, and Ungraceful
recovery. Our mechanisms and categories are described in detail in Section IV, and our themes are discussed in Section V.
D. Risks to Validity and Limitations
IDB data will be biased towards incidents that are significant
enough to merit being published publicly. We believe the
consequence of this bias is that our data set is comprised of
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incidents of greater than average significance. However, as we
are not attempting statistical generalization nor attempting to
capture the day to day work of engineers, the sample we have
collected suits our research objectives. It would be useful to
conduct a follow up research project aimed at understanding
how frequently each of the cascading mechanisms occur, as
part of, for example, understanding which are most important
to protect against.
The concepts (mechanisms, categories and themes) we
have identified are grounded in the 55 failure pairs we have
analyzed, and through our analysis we have refined them to the
point that they are stable across those pairs. Toward the end of
our analysis we were not adding new concepts, but refining and
adding new examples of already discovered concepts. These
concepts should not be viewed as comprehensive. Though
our set of incidents is relatively diverse, it is probable that
with a different set of incidents, and therefore a different set
of failure pairs, other concepts would emerge. We hope that
future research, by us or others, may extend our findings based
on more data.
The accuracy of our analysis of each failure pair, and specifically the cascading mechanisms, depends on the accuracy of
the authors of the incident reports. When the authors were not
certain about the cause of a failure, or more specifically, the
relationship between two failures, we excluded the failure pair
from our analysis. If the authors were incorrect or incomplete
in their explanation of the relationship, it is possible that our
analysis is similarly incorrect, which should be considered
when interpreting our results. However, in our experience,
significant effort is put into postmortem analyses, and we
believe that errors will be rare.

TABLE II
C ASCADING MECHANISMS BY CATEGORY AND THE NUMBER OF FAILURE
PAIRS IN EACH .

IV. A NALYTIC R ESULTS

Categories and Mechanisms

#

A

Deferring work and cascading failures
Exhausting resources while deferring work
Overwhelming with deferred work

6
3
3

B

Troubles (re)connecting
Failing to reconnect to restored service
Overwhelming with reconnections and resynchronizations

9
3
6

C

Resource competition and starvation
Competing for thread and CPU resources
Competing for database resources

8
4
4

D

Failing to handle an unsupported state
Failing to handle database state
Failing to handle unexpected state

6
3
3

E

Unsupportive support systems
Destructive load-balancing and health-checking
Cascading failures through control processes

8
4
4

F

A cluster of cascading failures
Cluster failing over to error state
Cluster reaching resources limits

6
4
2

G

Cascading while recovering
Adventures in rolling forward and back
Troubles restarting under duress

7
2
5

H

Responders cascading failures
Errors by incident responder
Calculated tradeoffs and deliberate shutdowns

5
2
3

A. Deferring Work and Cascading Failures

“Incidents are usually comprised of several systems–both
technical and human–interacting and overlapping in unexpected ways,”3 and it is those interactions that are at the
heart of cascading failures. In our analysis we have found
that these interactions include the actions of automation or
support systems, such as cluster management software and
auto-scaling groups; actions that are appropriate in some
contexts but unexpectedly detrimental in other contexts. We
have also found that as responders work to restore the system
to its normal state by resolving the initial failure and any
cascading failures, their actions have the potential to introduce
additional cascading failures as the system moves through
unusual states on its way back to normal.
In our analysis we identified 16 mechanisms, grouped into
eight categories, that capture the nature of the interactions that
contribute to cascading failures, as summarized in Table II and
discussed below. The mechanisms and categories presented
provide insights into some of the challenges associated with
engineering a truly resilient and well-supported system. Other
higher-level insights or themes that emerged during our analysis are discussed in Section V.

A class of fault-tolerance techniques that have the potential
to prevent some kinds of cascading failures involve deferring
work during a failure, with the idea of handling that work
when the failure is resolved. For example, a component that
sends messages to a dependency may queue failed messages
for later retry. Interestingly, in six failure pairs in our data
set, these techniques were actually central to the way that
a failure cascaded. This was generally because the failure
lasted longer, or required deferring more work, than the
techniques were designed to handle, suggesting that in some
cases the technique may simply delay or change the nature of
the cascading failure, but not prevent it. In our analysis we
identified two specific cascading mechanisms in this category.
1) Exhausting resources while deferring work: While waiting for a dependency to recover, a dependent component
that defers work may exhaust the resources used to store
that deferred work, as occurred in three failure pairs (TS.1,
D2.3, E1.2). For example, in D2.3 there was a mechanism
in place to handle network communication interruptions using
an in-memory “buffering mechanism” which “works great,”
but when the interruption persisted, the messages “quickly
filled the in-memory buffers [...] and caused many of [the

3 https://mailchimp.com/what-we-learned-from-the-recent-mandrill-outage
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servers] to run out of memory and fail.” In this case, a
mechanism to tolerate a likely failure (network interruptions)
also introduced other, potentially more serious failures (out of
memory). Similarly, in TS.1, on failed writes to a datastore,
the data to be written was logged to disk, eventually filling
the disk and causing a cascading failure.
2) Overwhelming with deferred work: On the other hand,
once a dependency recovers, the dependency (or other downstream systems) may be overwhelmed with traffic when the
dependent component begins retrying that work, as occurred
in three failure pairs (SF.1, TC.3, A3.2). For example, in
failure pair SF.1, in response to a power failure, responders
moved an application from one data center to another. A
backlog of “traffic” built up in the interim, leading to an
“increased traffic volume” which triggered a “latent firmware
bug” once the mitigation was complete. The consequence was
data corruption and a database outage. Similarly, in TC.3,
the system had so many queued items that when it started
processing them, it overwhelmed the CPU by starting too
many at once and immediately failed. In all three cases, the
downstream dependencies had sufficient capacity for the usual
volume of traffic but not the temporarily accelerated rate of
traffic.

the system was sufficient to maintain all connections and
incrementally synchronize data, but not sufficient to reestablish
all of those connections concurrently. For example, in failure
pair D2.2, one node in a cluster failed, millions of clients
lost a connection to the cluster, and a “thundering herd” of
reconnections caused the cluster to crash completely. Similarly,
in failure pair A1.1, a large number of primary nodes in a
highly redundant data store lost connection to their secondary
nodes and attempted to establish new secondaries, leading “to
a re-mirroring storm” that overwhelmed the disk volumes and
network. Then, that re-mirroring storm (along with a latent
defect, associated with closing network connections) led to a
vicious cycle of connections being exhausted and more node
failures.
C. Resource Competition and Starvation
One consequence of an initial failure can be changes to
load, capacity, or resource utilization in one or more components, and these changes can result in cascading failures. In
this subsection we discuss two such cascading mechanisms,
both related to shared resources, where a change in resource
utilization for one activity can cause resource starvation for
another.
1) Competing for thread and CPU resources: In four
failure pairs, a shared computational resource, such as a shared
thread pool or a server’s CPU, was central to the cascade
of a failure (EG.1, ST.2, CF.1, A1.2). In all four cases, an
initial failure caused an increase in computational resources
used for one activity, leading to a second activity failing
due to resource starvation. For example, in failure pair ST.2,
the initial failure was an outage of one database shard. On
dependent components, calls to that shard were blocked until
a timeout was reached, so “the unavailability of this shard
starved compute resources [...] and cascaded into a severe [...]
degradation” in dependent components. It is interesting to note
that the threads that were consumed were not actually doing
any work, as they were simply waiting for a response, but they
were nevertheless unavailable to other activities.
2) Competing for database resources: In four failure pairs,
the shared resource that was central to the cascade of a failure
was a database or database cluster, where an initial failure
led to an increase in resources consumed by one activity,
which in turn led to other activities being starved for database
resources or database failure (D1.2, GL.1, CC.1, TW.2). For
example, in failure GL.1, relatively less important maintenance
transactions contributed to a database overloading, causing a
cascading failure in clients of the database. Another consequence was that “the database replication process” stopped,
due to resource starvation, and some data was permanently
lost.

B. Troubles (Re)Connecting
In some distributed systems, client components may maintain a long-lived network connection with a server component.
In some cases, this connection is used to keep data in a
synchronized state. When an initial failure interrupts a longlived connection or results in other changes to the server
component (promoting a new primary, for example), issues
associated with reestablishing that connection, or the load
associated with multiple clients attempting to reconnect or resynchronize data, can lead to cascading failures.
1) Failing to reconnect to restored service: We identified
three failure pairs where the cascade was due to clients of
a cluster not responding appropriately once a cluster failed
over (D1.1, D1.3, PL.2). For example, in failure pair D1.1, a
remote database cluster “properly failed over to the secondary.”
However, due to a defect in the client side components, it
appeared to the application that the cluster had dropped offline.
Therefore the clients were unable to “properly handle the
failover.” As a result, failure in the cluster led to failures in the
clients. Similarly, in failure pair D1.3, in response to an initial
failure responders were required to restart a cluster, causing
a failure for the clients as they were not able to reconnect
to the restarted cluster due to a defect with a configuration
“setting for allowing users to quickly and safely reconnect” to
the cluster.
2) Overwhelming with reconnections and resynchronizations: Six of our failure pairs featured clients that maintain
a long-lived connection to a server or service. When an
initial failure interrupted those connections, a cascading failure
occurred as all of the clients simultaneously attempted to
reconnect, overwhelming the server as a result (EG.3, D2.2,
A1.1, A1.3, TW.1, E1.1). In these cases, the capacity of

D. Failing to Handle an Unsupported State
One category of cascading mechanism that we identified in
our data revolved around error or otherwise unsupported states.
Essentially, such cascading failures occur when an initial
failure leaves a component in an unsupported or error state,
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and a subsequent failure occurs as other components interact
with the component in an error state. Such an unsupported
state is generally different than an outage in terms of its effects
on other parts of a system. In the following, we describe two
such cascading mechanisms.
1) Failing to handle database state: In three failure pairs,
an initial failure left a database in a state that other components in the system did not support, resulting in cascading
failures (JO.1, MC.1, TW.4). The three unsupported database
states were dead locked, safety shutdown and read-only. For
example, in failure pair TW.4, an initial failure left a database
with incorrect data (financial account balances set to 0) and
the database in read-only mode. A second failure occurred as
the billing system began to repeatedly and erroneously charge
customer credit cards, because successful charges could not
be recorded in the read-only database, until responders “shut
down the billing system to prevent further charges.”
2) Failing to handle unexpected state: In three failure
pairs, the cascading mechanism was that one failure left a
component in an unsupported state or with corrupt data, and
a second failure occurred as other components interacted with
that component (TC.2, GH.2, SF.2). For example, in failure
pair TC.2 an initial failure left many virtual machines in an
unusual state as they failed to power on. A support process
then failed to clean them up, as it was configured only to clean
up virtual machines that terminated normally, which led to a
cascading failure due to the subsequent resource exhaustion.
In the case of failure pair GH.2, a database cluster failed over
to a new primary, but that primary was located in a distant
data center, causing cascading failures as applications were
“unable to cope with the additional latency introduced by a
cross-country round trip for the majority of their database
calls.” During failure pair SF.2, a primary database cluster
failed with “file inconsistencies” and, before it failed, those
“discrepancies had been replicated” to the secondary, which
then also failed and could not be used as a fallback to restore
service.

consequence was that the load balancer “automatically started
removing servers” but failed to replace them. “Servers kept
coming up, failing health checks, and going down again,”
eventually exhausting the provider-enforced limit on the number of servers that could be provisioned (BK.3) and hampering
responders’ efforts to later restore service. It is worth noting
that the removal of the healthy servers made a partial system
outage a complete system outage.
2) Cascading failures through control processes: Networking (and other) systems differentiate between control systems
and data systems. The data plane transmits data through
the network. The control plane manages and configures the
individual devices on the network. In four failure pairs, an
initial failure overloaded a control system or left one in an
error state, and, after some delay, that process’s absence or
inability to perform its functions caused a secondary failure
(G1.1, A2.1, HE.1, A1.4). For example, in failure pair A1.4,
a network was suffering a “re-mirroring storm,” and each remirror operation involved a call to the control plane, eventually
causing a “brown out” and more re-mirror failures in a vicious
cycle. In failure pair A2.1, due to an accidental manual deletion
of configuration data, the support system used to manage load
balancers was in a degraded state. As it made changes to load
balancers, in response to user requests through an API, those
load balancers became “improperly configured” and degraded
in performance. As a final example, in failure pair G1.1, when
an initial failure stopped the network control software, the
network eventually became congested, as routing information
changed and the network was not updated accordingly, causing
widespread cascading failures.
F. A Cluster of Cascading Failures
As mentioned above, various support systems are involved
in managing clusters, such as database clusters. One clusterrelated cascading mechanism that we have already discussed
occurs when clients of a cluster fail to reconnect to a cluster
after it fails over to a new primary node or recovers from
other failure scenarios (see IV-B). In this section we discuss
two other cluster-related cascading mechanisms.
1) Cluster failing over to error state: Cluster management
software is designed to tolerate various failure scenarios by, for
example, failing over to a new primary node. However, in four
failure pairs (GC.1, ST.1, GH.1, D2.1), the cluster management
software was unable to tolerate a particular scenario and so an
initial failure (say of one node) led to the failure of the cluster,
generally with additional cascading consequences for services
that depend on the cluster. For example, in failure pair ST.1,
due to a latent defect in the database cluster software, only
manifest in the presence of two “stalled” nodes, when the
original primary failed, the cluster was not able to promote
a new primary, though candidate nodes were available. In
failure pair GH.1, a network failure (a network partition event
between two data centers) led a database cluster to fail over to
a topology that was invalid and also a database state that could
not be reconciled automatically, as there were un-replicated
writes in each data center.

E. Unsupportive Support Systems
In addition to the core systems involved in cascading
failures, we also identified multiple examples of support or
auxiliary systems taking actions that led to a cascading failure.
Interestingly, these systems that can cause cascading failures
are often designed to prevent or mitigate failures. In this
section, we discuss cascading failures involving load balancers
and control systems. In the next section, we discuss cascading
failures associated with clusters and cluster management systems (see Section IV-F). Note that in other sections we also
discuss failure pairs that relate to support systems, such as
PL.1, D1.2, EG.1, EG.3 and others.
1) Destructive load-balancing and health-checking: In four
failure pairs, an initial failure led to a load balancer removing
healthy servers and causing a cascading failure (BK.1, BK.3,
EG.2, RD.1). For example, in failure BK.1, existing servers
failed health checks because the health check attempted to
establish a connection to an overloaded dependency. The
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2) Cluster reaching resource limits: In two failure pairs,
an initial failure caused a cluster to reach a resource limit,
resulting in a cascading failure (PL.1, TC.1). In incident PL.1
one cluster node hit “operating system network limits” and
failed, so the network load on the remaining nodes increased
until eventually all nodes failed in a “classic cascading failure.”
Interestingly, though the owners of the cluster monitored
various resource utilization metrics for the cluster, including
network related metrics, they were unaware of what the limit
was. In failure pair TC.1, a defect in the cluster management
system responsible for cleaning up unused virtual machines
caused a resource leak and eventually the “cluster was unable
to satisfy the resource reservations,” which led to a complete
failure of the cluster.

that system, but it read a bad configuration file and started
up in read-only mode and with no data in the customer
accounts, leading to a cascading failure as other components
attempted to interact with the database (see also the discussion in Section IV-D). Similarly, in GH2.1, the initial error
was a power outage, and, once power was restored, several
components failed to restart because “the boot path of [the
associated] application code” had a “hard dependency” on
other components that were also still recovering. It is also
possible for a cascading failure to occur after a restart, as in
failure pair RD.2 where, after “all servers were restored ...
[the] new caches were still empty,” leading to latency-related
failure for clients. In addition to these five failure pairs, we
have previously discussed cascading failures that occurred as
clients attempt to reconnect to a newly restarted component
(see Section IV-B).

G. Cascading While Recovering
Some cascading failures we identified occurred due to
automated or manual actions taken while responding to the
failure. Such actions are often taken with limited testing, may
represent rare system operations, and may bring the system
into unusual states, so it is perhaps not surprising that there
are risks associated with the actions. In this section we discuss
two such cascading mechanisms, and in the next section we
discuss other actions responders take that can lead to cascading
failures (see Section IV-H).
1) Adventures in rolling forward and back: When a source
code or configuration change introduces a defect and causes
an incident, responders or automated systems may return a
component back to a previous version (called rolling back).
Alternatively, responders may roll out a new version of the
component with a fix (called rolling forward). In either case,
when these occur during an incident, opportunities for testing are limited, and the new version combinations can lead
to additional cascading failures, as occurred in two failure
pairs in our data set (ST.3, T2.1). In failure pair ST.3, one
component was rolled back to a previous version, due to a
defect, and the “rolled-back [component] interacted poorly
with a recently-introduced” configuration change, leading to
an additional cascading failure. On the other hand, in failure
pair T2.1, because some deleted virtual-machine images were
unrecoverable, the responders rolled scheduled jobs forward
to newer virtual-machine images, resulting in failed jobs and
weeks of “all hands support” to fix all of the issues that were
introduced. In a related scenario, the failure pair RD.1 was
triggered by an automated rollback. In this failure pair, the
rollback was not the cascading mechanism, but was instead
the instigating event. The engineers had manually disabled
the load balancer in order to reconfigure the system. Another
support system noticed the manual change and automatically
removed it (rolled it back), thereby causing the subsequent
chain of cascading failures.
2) Troubles restarting under duress: At times, a component
of a system is restarted in response to an initial failure.
In five failure pairs, that restart was central to a cascading
failure (BK.2, TW.3, GH2.1, RD.2, A3.1). For example, in
TW.3, a database was rebooted manually, a rare operation for

H. Responders Cascading Failures
Building on the discussion in the previous section about
cascading failures that occur during incident recovery (see
Section IV-G), here we discuss situations where responders,
deliberately or not, may directly cause cascading failures.
While these mechanisms might not be considered cascading
failures in the traditional sense of the word, they are included
here for completeness.
1) Errors by incident responder: In two failure pairs, we
identified actions taken by responders, in response to an initial
failure, as unintentionally leading to a cascading failure (GL.2,
CC.2). Note that some actions taken during an incident may
not necessarily follow typical operational procedures and may
be done under a time pressure. For example, in incident GL,
while attempting to repair a data replication process between a
primary and secondary database, a responder deleted production data on the primary database “errantly thinking they were
doing so on the secondary” (GL.2). Due to a coincident failure,
no recent backups of the database were available, leading to
permanent data loss.
2) Calculated tradeoffs and deliberate shutdowns: Three
failure pairs in our data set are examples of responders
deliberately choosing to cause or allow a cascading failure
(SF.3, GH.3, A2.2). Each of these failure pairs feature responders making application-specific tradeoffs, often between
the lesser of two or more evils. For example, in failure pair
SF.3, responders performed a time-consuming and resourceintensive data restore process to mitigate an initial failure, and
a “backlog of built up jobs” developed. Responders decided
“to not impact a second day of customer activity” so they
abandoned the data restore process, “halted several internal
jobs and [...] staggered initial customer activity.” Taken together, these resulted in several cascading failures but avoided
another general failure due to excess database load. In failure
pair GH.3, the responders “made an explicit choice to partially
degrade site usability” to “prioritize data integrity over site
usability and time to recover.” Similarly, in failure pair A2.2,
due to the error state of a control system, changes by users
to their load balancer would result in “degraded performance
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and errors,” so responders disabled various “control plane
workflows” to prevent this.

resources, like with retries or reconnections, catching up with
that deferred work can cause excessive load on a component
after an initial failure is resolved, causing a cascading failure
and delaying the full recovery of the system.
One perspective on the nature or cause of these resourcerelated cascading failures is that in many ways, systems are
engineered based on an implicit assumption of abundance.
That is, an engineer may assume there are enough threads,
memory, CPU cycles, et cetera, and engineer the system
accordingly, with some attempts to handle specific exceptional
scenarios. When that assumption does not hold–that is, during
moments of scarcity–the system may fail completely rather
than degrade gracefully. Similarly, we may assume that we
can automatically scale up and that it is always cost-effective
to do so. From our analysis, it is clear that the assumption
of abundance does not always hold as systems degrade and
fail. Nor does it always hold as systems recover from failures,
with components operating at less than full capacity for some
period of time. We have also seen that “adding a few more
nodes” may not always be “that simple” [PL.1].
To develop more graceful alternatives, it may be valuable
to ask the question: How could we engineer a system that
does not assume abundance, but simply makes effective use of
the available resources? If the typical approach is to assume
we have an abundance of resources, then that assumption
is supported with resource allocation and scaling strategies.
Often, excess resources are allocated to account for the time
required to add resources, for example. In other situations, as
our data shows, excess resources might be allocated because of
the risk of complete failure when demand exceeds supply, even
by a small amount. The proposed alternative is to engineer
the system to make do with what is available at the moment,
with the result that allocation decisions become more flexible
and perhaps more efficient in normal operation. Our analysis
suggests that such an approach may lead to systems that are
more resilient during incidents.
Arguably, that approach to engineering systems may be
well supported by changes to how we think about system
requirements. Often, system requirements are expressed as
binary. For example, consider a system that generates a
complex product page on a retail site. The requirements might
say that the page request must return in less than 500ms, but
there is no information that would inform decision making
if the system is degraded. This observation applies to both
functional and non-functional system requirements. Though
not all work a system component performs is of equal value,
functional requirements do not always express the relative
value of that work. A performance requirement expressed as
a maximum response time, for example, is not rich enough
to inform decisions about queuing work or shedding load
when trade-offs need to be made. To demonstrate this concept,
consider the product page mentioned above. It might normally
show a name, description, picture, price, user reviews, similar
items, manufacturer, and a host of other information. If the
system is degraded, should it return fewer elements, or should
it take longer to returns all elements? Does it treat all client

V. T HEMES
In this section we discuss higher-level themes that emerged
from our analysis, and in particular our selective coding. The
discussion of these ideas is organized around three stages
of an incident’s life cycle, based on the simple observation
that broadly speaking cascading failures can happen in one
of three ways. First, and possibly most expected, a cascading
failure may be due simply to one system component failing in
some way and another component being unable to tolerate that
failure leading to ungraceful degradation (see Section V-A).
Second, a cascading failure may occur when support systems
or automation systems responding to an initial failure, and
introduce an additional failure (see Section V-B). Finally,
cascading failures may occur as responders attempt to mitigate
or resolve a failure, intentionally or unintentionally, leading to
more failures and an ungraceful recovery (see Section V-C).
As we discuss these higher-level themes, we conclude each of
the following subsections with a discussion of the implications
these themes may have for the engineering of resilient systems.
A. Ungraceful Degradation
Many cascading failures in our data set are examples of subsystems failing abruptly, in contrast to degrading gracefully.
A lack of resources, or a mismatch between load and capacity
(demand being greater than supply) are at the heart of the
reason these failures cascaded, and that mismatch can occur
in many different ways during an incident. When resources
are shared between two or more activities, an initial failure
with one activity may starve the other activity, such as when
regular load, automated maintenance activities, and backups
competed for database resources, leading to failure pair GL.1.
When a work load is shared between multiple components, a
load-related failure of one component leaves more load for the
remaining components, in a “classic cascading failure” [PL.1].
Similarly, in response to some types of failures, clients of a
component may need to reconnect, re-mirror, or retry requests,
leading to excessive load, possibly on a component already in
distress, and a subsequent failure such as occurred in E1.1.
Naturally, if demand is greater than supply, we would hope
the system would at least be able to handle some of that
demand, rather than simply fail abruptly and handle none of
it. Various fault-tolerance or graceful degradation techniques
are used in systems, including the systems in the incident
reports we analyzed, to guard against some resource-related
failure scenarios. In some cases, a technique such as load
shedding may accomplish this, but it is not applicable to all
of the cases we describe above and is also a “blunt tool,”
indiscriminately shedding demand. Other techniques also have
limits and, in some cases, may simply delay a resourcerelated cascading failure or even cause one. For example, an
in-memory “buffering mechanism” for failed-message sends
can cause components “to run out of memory and fail”
[D2.3]. Even when deferred work does not exhaust available
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requests equally? Perhaps the product page above would give
less data to some customers, or take a longer time for other
customers, or meet the stated requirements for some while
ignoring others. Requirements that capture the costs of delay
or decaying utility over time may better support engineering
a system that can make appropriate trade-offs under distress.
For a different example, if a cache has a specified time to
live (TTL), but the database is slow or is not responding, is it
better to empty the cache or extend the TTL?

server’s connection to the degraded database, and the load
balancer with the lowest configured threshold “automatically
started removing servers,” leading to a complete outage for
that service. Attempts to add new servers failed due to a
defect and those attempts continued until the cloud provider’s
“request limit” was reached, which later hampered responders’
efforts to mitigate the issue. It is important to note that
the removed servers were healthy, and removing them was
counter productive, suggesting there was a mismatch between
the signal from the health check and the action taken by
the automation, or that the action ought to consider more
context (such as the health of the database, in this case). Other
automated actions that caused cascading failure in our data set
were an automated rollback RD.1, a garbage collection system
TC.1, and a web pre-processor CF.1, as well as the cluster
managers and backup systems mentioned above.
One way to think about this problem is that the automated
actions are taken based on assumptions, and the system may
not always be checking to ensure that the assumptions hold.
So even if the actual scenario unfolding during an incident
is different in important ways from what was envisioned
when the automation was put in place, the actions are carried
out and are relentlessly continued even if they are doing
harm. A simple improvement may be to be explicit about
those assumptions when designing the automation. In some
cases it may be useful to implement additional checks to
ensure assumptions hold and define a continue criteria (or
the reverse, a back-out criteria) for actions that would allow
the automation system to determine when its actions are not
having the intended effect and should be discontinued. This
concept could be modeled as a measure of certainty that the
assumption holds, possibly with multiple inputs influencing
that measure.
As an example of this idea, consider a failure similar to
EG.2 in which an automated system removed servers from a
fleet due to failing health checks, replacing those with new
servers. The assumption being made is servers are in a bad
state and replacing them will lead to an increasing proportion
of healthy servers. The action taken based on that assumption
is to replace servers and each replacement takes a known
duration. A relevant continue criteria could be that the ratio of
healthy servers increases proportional to the number replaced.
Then the automation system could pace the action, checking
the criteria as it went, and only continue the action as long as
the criteria held. If it did not, as was the case in this failure,
it could discontinue the action in favor of an alternative or
simply wait for the responders to determine the best course
of action, rather than cause a cascading failure and make the
incident harder for responders to unwind.

B. Automating Failure
Secondary support systems and automation systems may
unexpectedly contribute to a cascading failure. Examples of
support systems include cluster management software that may
respond to failed nodes in a cluster and closely related database
redundancy systems. Automation systems in our data set
include load-balancers performing health checks and removing
servers that are in an error state, processes for automatically
adding servers to a service when more capacity is needed, etc.
Our analysis has identified two ways that such systems may
contribute to cascading failures.
First, support systems are subject to failures just like other
systems, and these failures can be cascading failures when
they adversely affect the system they are supposed to be
supporting. Examples include cluster management software
that was unable to promote a new primary in a particular
failure scenario “due to a bug that was fixed but not yet
deployed” (D2.1) or when another did promote a new primary
but the result was an invalid cluster topology, a database in
a bad state, and failures in dependent services (GH.1). In
that last example, the result was “degraded service for 24
hours” while responders repaired the damage caused by the
cluster management software’s handling of the failure. Cluster
management (and similar) software are controlled by many
configuration parameters or constraints, which need to be
satisfied in each failure scenario. That can lead to “extremely
unusual behavior [...] in certain failure conditions,” (GC.1)
such as being unable to “decide where the [new] primary
should run,” despite the appropriate choice being clear to the
responders. The cascading mechanisms cluster failing over to
error state (see IV-F1) and failing to handle database state
(see IV-D1) involve cluster-management related failures. The
cascading mechanisms troubles (re)connecting (see IV-B)
and cascading failures through control processes (see IV-E2)
contain examples of other automatic support systems where
the initial failure had clearly been anticipated, and a suitable
response had been designed and implemented, but the response
did not produce the expected result.
Second, automation systems may take actions that, while
reasonable in some contexts, are based on an incorrect view
of the overall event and of the consequences of those actions.
Automation played a role in all three of BK’s failure pairs. The
initial failure began when a shared database “couldn’t keep
up [with load] and its CPUs started maxing out.” Three loadbalanced and auto-scaled services began experiencing some
health check failures, because the health checks checked the

C. Ungraceful Recovery
An initial failure during incident PL “led to a number of
cascading failures throughout [their] plant, which took [their]
team some time to fully unwind.” As discussed under theme
ungraceful degradation above, system components degrading
can be dangerous for other components, and the longer the
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degradation lasts, the more dangerous it is. Interestingly, we
have also found that a component recovering can also be
dangerous. Even during the manual or automated response
to an incident, additional cascading failures can occur. There
is messiness and risk associated with unwinding the error
state of a system. The process may take time and include
attempted fixes that fail (see categories IV-E1 and IV-G2) and
may require deliberately degrading components until they can
be safely restored (see category IV-H2).
For many of the complex systems in our data set, there
was no straightforward way to bring the system from the
error state they were in to a normal state. Certain restoration activities need to be carefully ordered, are delicate, or
are rarely performed, as in incident SF, which featured a
subsystem which, at the time of the incident, the responders
had not “completely restarted [...] for many years.” Since that
time, business growth and other changes made the restart, and
validating its integrity, take “longer than expected.” During
incident D2, the responders needed to restart a cluster, but
needed to make some configuration changes first, as they were
concerned about “simply letting the thundering herd that is
millions of [...] clients reconnect to [the cluster] at once.” And
in other cases, such as during incident RD, responders simply
need to wait. Incident A1 is an extreme example of “hard to
unwind” failures, because the failure included a storage cluster
and the responders were attempting to avoid data loss. The
process took multiple days and ongoing careful attention by
the engineers and still was not completely successful.
In incident PL the recovery plan involved a series of stages
that did not go as expected. Backlogs had to be processed
or deleted; data had to be backfilled (“re-process a massive
backlog of data” to catch up to real-time); servers had to
be added to replace failed servers and new clusters put in
operation. Clusters had to be expanded, even if responders
were “not sure how gracefully it would handle dynamic cluster
expansion” and still needed to be manually rebalanced even if
they did handle it “gracefully.” Such response activities needed
to be carefully ordered and paced, so they “slowly flipped
on downstream consumer systems,” carefully tracking the
results. Such multi-day recovery efforts often involve neveror rarely-experienced combinations of component states, and
demonstrate ways that components had not been engineered
to automatically recover when other components recover.
Despite the limitations we discussed above, techniques for
tolerating failure and degrading gracefully are common considerations when designing systems. Our analytic results suggest
there would be value in also considering closely related techniques for tolerating recovery or for gracefully recovering. We
argue that a system that can gracefully recover has at least four
properties. First, components can wait patiently while another
component is in a distressed state and can return to normal
operation when the subsystem recovers, ideally with no time
limit and no intervention needed. Second, the order of recovery
is unconstrained, meaning that if multiple components are in
degraded states, they can recover (by restarting, for example)
in an arbitrary order. Third, no subsystems need to be manually

turned off and back on during response. Fourth, state changes
(e.g. restarts) are handled gracefully, avoiding “resync storms”
and “thundering herds.”
VI. S UMMARY
We have identified eight categories of mechanisms for
cascading failure, with two cascading mechanisms in each.
Some of these categories are no surprise to anyone. Others
might be less obvious. By using these categories as reference
points, we hope to make it easier for engineers to design,
maintain, and improve systems with fewer cascading failures.
We have also identified three themes that we believe can
help engineers to design better systems. ”Ungraceful degradation” discusses existing fault-tolerance strategies and some
of their weaknesses. It also argues for the need to create
requirements documents that detail how a system should
handle a degradation in service. ”Automating failure” reviews
how auxiliary systems can initiate or contribute to cascading
failures. It also reiterates the need to check assumptions before
blindly implementing counterproductive measures, which may
lead to additional cascading failures. ”Unwinding from failure”
covers the need to design components that are as independent
as possible from the rest of the system, in order to simplify
and accelerate recovery when a failure occurs.
All of these are tasks that initially fall to system designers.
But as systems change over time, these principles also need
to be checked regularly by the engineers to ensure continued
conformity.
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